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I 
INTRODUCTION 
In legal scholarship, it is almost self-evident that “certainty” is an advantage 
for regulation.1 “Uncertainty,” on the other hand, is usually viewed as an 
inevitable by-product of vague legal standards that may be justified by the 
prohibitive cost of creating bright-line rules or by the inability of the legislature 
to account ex ante for the complexity of a particular situation.2 This article 
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 1. See Joseph Raz, Legal Principles and the Limits of Law, 81 YALE L.J. 823, 841–42 (1972) 
(“Since the law should strive to balance certainty and reliability against flexibility, it is, on the whole, 
wise legal policy to use rules as much as possible for regulating human behavior as they are more 
certain than principles and lend themselves more easily to uniform and predictable application.”); see 
also Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 279, 298–99 (1986) (analyzing two undesirable social effects that stem from uncertain regulation: 
(1) over-deterrence and (2) inefficient risk-taking); Kenneth W. Gideon, Assessing the Income Tax: 
Transparency, Simplicity, Fairness, 25 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 101, 104–06 (1999) (arguing against the use of 
broad standards in tax law because of the harm of uncertainty); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a 
Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1178–83 (1989) (arguing that courts should decide cases in such 
a way that provides guidance to lower courts, future legislators, and citizens); Kathleen M. Sullivan, 
The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV 22, 
62–64 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 957 (1995) (describing the 
conventional view that clarity of rules is a target of law). For a review of some of the main drawbacks of 
uncertainty in antitrust law, see Daniel A. Crane, Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication, 64 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 49, 99 (2007). 
 2. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 562–63 
(1992) (observing that while rules are less costly than standards to interpret and apply, they are more 
costly to create). In the context of contract law, similar claims regarding the cost of contractual 
vagueness have been put forth. See Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract 
Interpretation, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1581, 1587–88 (2005); Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, 
Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814 (2006); Steven Shavell, On the Writing 
and Interpretation of Contracts, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 289 (2006). But see Albert Choi & George 
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challenges the conventional view and proclaims the advantages of legal 
uncertainty.3 
This article combines jurisprudential argument with behavioral analysis and 
experimental demonstration. The jurisprudential argument exposes the 
distorting effect of the law, which leads people to neglect their genuine 
preferences and moral perceptions and behave in a manipulative–strategic way. 
It further identifies contexts and circumstances in which creating a “veil of 
ignorance,” which partially masks people’s awareness and knowledge of the ex 
post legal consequences of their acts, may be desirable. 
The jurisprudential discussion begins with the merits of creating a partial 
veil of ignorance for the ex post consequences of the law. Such a veil may 
promote values such as autonomy, efficiency, distributive justice, and personal 
well-being. Furthermore, such a veil of ignorance may encourage people to act 
in a natural and non-strategic way, namely, in a way that is not driven by legal 
incentives. Nonetheless, we also recognize the obvious problems associated with 
creating a veil that masks the ex post implications of the law. Indeed, ignorance 
of the law seems to be at odds with the main purpose of legal regimes, such as 
torts and criminal law, which aim to guide people’s behavior.4 Furthermore, the 
argument seems to run into a logical paradox: If following the law may create 
more harm than good, should not such a law be abandoned altogether? And if 
the law is just and efficient, why should it be hidden? Recognizing these 
challenges, we developed an innovative taxonomy comprised of three types of 
legal areas where masking the legal consequences of an act ex ante will benefit 
both individuals and society at large. 
The first type occurs when people who find themselves in a certain situation 
ex post are offered a solution, but policy makers wish to prevent a case where 
they choose to be in that situation ex ante. 
Such tension between one’s ex post legal status and ex ante knowledge of 
the law was recognized by Meir Dan-Cohen’s canonical argument on acoustic 
separation in criminal law. According to Dan-Cohen, the law speaks with two 
 
Triantis, Completing Contracts in the Shadow of Costly Verification, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 503, 503–04 
(2008) (arguing that ambiguity signals an unwillingness to sue). 
 3. Contrary to the conventional view, support for uncertainty was developed recently by Alon 
Harel & Uzi Segal, Criminal Law and Behavioral Law and Economics: Observations on the Neglected 
Role of Uncertainty in Deterring Crime, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 276, 277 (1999). In the context of tax 
law, see generally David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths About Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 215 (2002); Kyle 
D. Logue, Optimal Tax Compliance and Penalties When the Law Is Uncertain, 27 VA. TAX REV. 241 
(2007). According to those views, in the context of tax law, uncertainty may enhance the deterrence 
effect of regulation due to risk aversion. This article, however, highlights the opposing side, arguing that 
uncertainty decreases legal influence on behavior in a way that strengthens “authentic behaviors.” See 
also Craswell & Calfee, supra note 1 (identifying similar effects in torts law). 
 4. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 
207–09 (1968) (discussing the use of law to deter crime). At least in the context of criminal law, 
ambiguity may lead to invalidation of the law. Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) 
(“[A] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common 
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first 
essential of due process of law.”). 
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voices. To the individual, the law issues rules that instruct the individual how to 
behave. To the authorities (for example, courts and administrative agencies), 
the law uses “decision rules” to assist in determining the legal ramifications of 
an individual’s actions.5 
While Dan-Cohen’s focus is on the institutional aspect of the distinction 
between conduct and decision rules within the context of criminal law, this 
article’s framework differs in a few ways. First, it focuses on ways in which 
“legal ignorance” may be desirable in the law in general, not only with regard to 
certain defenses within criminal law. Second, it provides a larger framework to 
distinguish between rules that attempt to direct the individual how to behave 
and rules that respond to the specific situation of the individual.6 
The second type of situation in which the veil may be beneficial is that in 
which a certain course of action is desirable only when undertaken with 
genuine, nonstrategic motives. For example, in the tax context, policy makers 
may allow a certain transaction to take place, but not purely for purposes of tax 
avoidance. 
The third type focuses on the identity-related value that may emerge when 
one is unaware of potential legal benefits for engaging in socially desirable 
activities. Although in the second type, policy makers are neutral to one’s 
choice of action as long as one’s motivation is genuine, in the third type, there is 
a desired course of action. If one’s motivation is not driven by legal benefits, the 
value to both self and society from one’s behavior will increase. Classic 
examples are organ donation and surrogacy, where society sees such action as 
desirable but fears the inadvertent harm of incentives for donors. Such harm 
may occur due to psychological processes such as crowding-out motivation or 
sociological processes such as commodification.  
Following this taxonomy, we rely on behavioral methodologies and theories 
to demonstrate how uncertainty may become an effective veil for the ex post 
ramifications of the law. We begin with an examination of possible behavioral 
theories that support the proposition that when the law is uncertain, people are 
likely to diminish their reliance on legal benefits during the decision-making 
process. 
Using an experimental survey approach, we compare the reported future 
behavior of respondents taken from a representative panel of the Israeli 
population toward employment practices under different legal regimes. The 
experimental manipulation focuses on the certainty of granting benefits 
associated with getting a “non-employer” status. Findings suggest that under 
conditions of uncertainty (for example, ambiguity and partial uncertainty where 
probabilities were provided), participants were less affected by benefits granted 
under the law. In contrast, when participants were asked to evaluate the 
 
 5. Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 
97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 630–31 (1984). 
 6. We focus here on explaining the difference between our first type and Dan-Cohen’s argument; 
our second and third types are too different to enable a meaningful comparison. 
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behavior of others, uncertain benefits did have an effect on their behavior. The 
study also demonstrates an interaction, where uncertainty is more influential for 
individuals with low and intermediate levels of preference than for those with 
strong preferences. 
We then recognize some of the drawbacks of uncertainty, even in those 
areas where masking the law is desirable. First, there is the fear of excessive 
litigation. Second, there are distributive problems that might arise given an 
inequality in the effect of uncertainty on different parties. Those concerns are 
taken into account in part V of this paper, which discusses policy implications. 
To clarify our arguments, we wish to define and provide context to some of 
the main concepts that are used in this article. First, the concepts of uncertainty 
and ambiguity, which are treated as two different concepts in the Judgment and 
Decision Making (JDM) literature,7 are used interchangeably throughout this 
paper, as the differences between the two meanings are less relevant for our 
purposes than for JDM scholars. Second, throughout this article, we use the 
terms “genuineness” and “authenticity” especially with regard to the distinction 
between one’s initial preference and one’s attempt to gain instrumental legal 
benefits. In the philosophical literature, the association of authenticity with the 
notion of staying true to oneself when facing external values is constantly 
challenged, as philosophers and psychologists recognize that in the real world, 
where social forces play a dominant role, achieving full authenticity is neither 
possible nor desirable.8 Indeed, we recognize the contribution of social and legal 
institutions to the formation of one’s preference. Nonetheless, clearly, the law 
also has direct instrumental calculative legal effects, and our focus on the 
potential positive role of masking the law through uncertainty is mainly aimed 
at this function. 
II 
LEGAL IGNORANCE AS BLISS 
A.  Theoretical Framework 
Law is one of society’s most important tools for directing behavior. Every 
legal system contains incentives for certain kinds of activities and penalties for 
others.9 Law also has important roles in designing social institutions10 and 
 
 7. These two concepts are the most heavily studied in the JDM literature. For an example that 
attempts to study the relationship between these two concepts in the decision-making process, see 
generally Hillel J. Einhorn & Robin M. Hogarth, Ambiguity and Uncertainty in Probabilistic Inference, 
92 PSYCHOL. REV. 433 (1985). 
 8. For a discussion of the complex concept of “authenticity,” see generally Charles Taylor, The 
Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM 25 (Amy Gutman ed., 1994) and LIONEL TRILLING, 
SINCERITY AND AUTHENTICITY (1972). 
 9. See Becker, supra note 4. 
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expressing societal values.11 Taking into account these important legal functions, 
the conventional view is that policy makers should aspire to increase the 
likelihood that people will take the existence of the law into account when 
making decisions. 
While in certain contexts it is desirable to increase awareness of the ex post 
legal results of activity, the conventional view does not take into account the 
distorting effect of the law on the ability of an individual to act in a way that 
would represent his or her genuine preferences, moral perception, and true 
economic interests. When the law becomes too dominant in the decision-
making process, it results in manipulative behavior and excessive reliance on 
strategic reasoning. This eventually undermines efficiency, autonomy, 
distributive justice, and psychological welfare. 
Finding the right balance between the positive role of the law to guide 
behavior and its negative distorting effect is a challenging task. While we do not 
espouse a complete solution to this problem, we explore three types of 
situations where the distorting effect of the law has negative results. In such 
circumstances, decreasing the saliency of the law during decision-making 
enhances autonomy, efficiency, distributive justice, and personal well-being, 
while at the same time narrows undesirable effects, such as commodification12 
and crowding-out.13 This demonstrates why lawmakers should take seriously the 
distorting effect of the law, as well as the potential harm caused by partial 
masking through legal ambiguity and over-reliance on the law. 
B.  Moral Hazards and the Ex Post Versus Ex Ante Functions of the Law 
The first type of situation in which the veil of uncertainty is beneficial is 
when policy makers desire to provide legal relief ex post without changing ex 
ante decision-making. Separation between ex post and ex ante perceptions can 
help distinguish between the two functions of law—guidance and 
responsiveness—and ensure that the second function will not undermine the 
first.14 Ex ante, the law’s main function is to guide behavior, while ex post, its 
main function is to respond to situations that people may face. In its guiding 
role, the law should motivate people to engage in behaviors that will be good 
 
 10. See Shahar Lifshitz, Married Against Their Will? Toward a Pluralist Regulation of Spousal 
Relationships, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1565, 1591–92 (2009) (emphasizing the law’s ability to shape 
social institutions, such as cohabitation). 
 11. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2022–24 
(1996). 
 12. For a discussion of the concept of commodification, see Elizabeth S. Anderson, Is Women’s 
Labor a Commodity?, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 71, 81–83 (1990) and Margaret Jane Radin, Market-
Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1930–33 (1987). 
 13. For an account of the psychological process of crowding-out motivation, see infra note 20 and 
accompanying text. 
 14. See P.S. Atiyah, From Principles to Pragmatism: Changes in the Function of the Judicial Process 
and the Law, 65 IOWA L. REV. 1249, 1251 (1979–1980) (discussing the decreased willingness of judges 
and legislatures to adhere to harsh principles in order to promote desirable behavior and deter 
undesirable behavior). 
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for society as a whole. In its responsive function, however, the law helps people 
who are in dire situations with little regard to their ex ante intentions. 
This separation between the two functions of the law is obviously difficult. 
There is a fear that the law’s responsive role will undermine its guiding one. 
This problem was addressed by Meir Dan-Cohen’s acoustic separation 
argument in criminal law. According to Dan-Cohen, conveying one message to 
the general public and another to the enforcing authorities may ensure that the 
relief given to people who fall under an excuse defense, ex post, does not affect 
their ex ante behavior.15 Our first type dealing with the distorting effect of law is 
based on a related concept. We view the problem addressed by Dan-Cohen in 
the context of criminal law as a more general one: people who are aware of the 
legal reaction to their ex post status might be in a morally hazardous situation 
where they will be guided by the responsive function of the law. Masking the 
law may prevent inefficient moves by individuals who would rely ex ante on ex 
post solutions. Beyond the moral-hazard rationale, masking the law is desirable 
because it ensures that the ex post relief is given only to those who did not 
choose to be in that status strategically, ex ante. Because part of the justification 
for the ex post relief is that people find themselves in a situation unwillingly, the 
mechanism of masking the law will ensure that relief is given only to people 
who find themselves in dire situations despite good-faith attempts to avoid such 
predicaments. 
Bankruptcy law exemplifies a legal scenario where the ex ante–ex post 
tensions justify masking the law. Ex ante, the debtor assumes full responsibility 
over the debt when making the economic decision of whether to take a loan and 
how to invest it. However, if the debtor is unable to pay back the loan, the law 
provides relief through various legal arrangements. If the debtor knew ex ante 
the exact nature of the ex post legal relief, there is a potential for morally 
hazardous behavior by the debtor.16 Furthermore, according to our second 
justification for masking the law, when people are unaware of their ex post legal 
status, ex ante, there is greater moral justification for protecting them.17 
 
 15. Dan-Cohen, supra note 5, at 633. 
 16. See Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy or Bailouts?, 35 J. CORP. L. 469, 485–86 
(addressing the role of moral hazards in bankruptcy law). 
 17. In Part V, which focuses on legal implications, we shall return to these examples with greater 
focus on the legal design. We will also demonstrate a second scenario in family law with regard to the 
distinction between the economic relationship between married partners and that of cohabitants. Ex 
ante, the distinction between marriage and cohabitation commitments is justified because it provides a 
“screening mechanism” for spouses to express their different preferences. According to this view, the 
distinction between marriage and cohabitation does not reflect the superiority of marriage, but rather 
the advantage of diversity of spousal institutions. Ex post, however, cohabitation law should impose on 
cohabitants the responsive components of marriage law that aims to prevent exploitation and protect 
weaker parties in the relationship. Masking the ex post responsive effect of the law may help to 
preserve the ex ante effect of the screening mechanism. 
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C.  Ensuring Genuine Choice 
The case for masking the law extends beyond separation of ex post and ex 
ante and applies even when one has to choose ex ante between two legitimate 
courses of action. This second type deals with a situation where the desirability 
of a certain course of action taken by an individual may be achieved only when 
it is done for non-strategic reasons. Thus, we argue that when law has too big of 
a role in one’s motivations, it may jeopardize the purpose of the law itself. In 
these scenarios, the policy maker is indifferent to the course of action taken by 
the individual as long as it is not chosen as a way to circumvent the law. 
Tax law is a good example of the benefits that may arise from masking the 
law. While the conventional view emphasizes the advantages of certainty and 
clarity in tax law,18 recent innovative lines of literature suggest that strategic tax 
planning may lead to inefficient results.19 Converging this line of scholarship 
with our second type suggests that the legal policy maker should differentiate 
between a transaction that takes place for genuine economic reasons and 
another transaction done purely for tax-avoidance purposes. A mechanism that 
masks the ex post tax status of a given transaction will increase the chance that 
people will behave authentically in accordance with their true economic 
preferences. 
Another classic example is in employment law, where the legal policy maker 
is willing to recognize that not all long-term hiring relationships between people 
are employment relationships. People may be legitimately hired as either 
employees or as independent contractors if the choice is driven by genuine 
economic and organizational rationales, but not when it is driven primarily for 
the purpose of gaining legal benefits. Given that employing an individual as a 
contractor might relieve the employer of the responsibility for providing 
employment benefits, it is sometimes tempting for employers to define their 
employees as service providers for that reason alone. When getting these legal 
benefits is the dominant factor in the choice of how to define the relationship, 
the law might distort one’s behavior. Furthermore, in the context of 
employment law, there is a concern that the asymmetric bargaining power 
might allow employers to behave strategically and manipulate the law to their 
advantage at the expense of employees’ rights. In sum, when the motivation for 
an action is crucial for its desirability, using legal techniques that hide the ex 
post legal consequences of those actions is justified. 
 
 18. See United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 307 (1967) (choosing to retain a bright-line rule 
instead of a case-by-case approach, thereby avoiding uncertainty and excessive litigation). 
 19. See David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths About Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 215, 224 (2002) 
(“Anytime anyone alters his behavior because of taxes we have the same problem—the changed 
behavior imposed cost on others that the person does not take into account.”). But see Leo Katz, In 
Defense of Tax Shelters, 26 VA. TAX REV. 799, 800–01 (2007) (responding to Weisbach’s arguments). 
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D.  Shielding Altruistic Motivation 
The third type is related to the context of pro-social behaviors where the 
action taken may be generally desirable, but when taken to achieve legal or 
economic benefits, may cause harm to the individual or to society at large. The 
harm might occur due to psychological processes such as crowding-out 
motivation or sociological processes such as commodification. 
Crowding-out literature suggests that when people base their behavior on 
external rewards, they discount moral incentives for their behavior, thereby 
lowering the effect of intrinsic motivation. As applied to the regulation of pro-
social behavior, this theory would predict that saliency of the law in decision-
making would undermine intrinsic motivations.20 For instance, paying people in 
return for their blood may lead donors to view the event as a transaction rather 
than as a charitable act, thereby reducing altruistic blood donations.21 Edward 
Deci, Richard Koestner, and Richard Ryan have argued that “tangible rewards 
tend to have a substantially negative effect on intrinsic motivation.”22 They warn 
that attempts to externally control behavior may yield long-term 
counterproductive results. An interesting twist in the crowding-out motivation 
approach comes from research conducted on image motivation in the context of 
incentives. According to a study conducted by Dan Ariely and his colleagues, 
the effect of extrinsic motivation on intrinsic motivation is highly related to the 
way in which one perceives that he or she is viewed by society. In their study, 
the negative effect of incentives was evident only when the behavior was 
conducted in public—when others were watching—not when the behavior was 
done in a private setting.23 This modification of the theory suggests that the 
uncertainty effect is needed not only for the individual, but also for the 
individual’s view of how he or she is perceived by others, given that the 
individual engages in pro-social behaviors due to extrinsic motivation. 
 
 20. See Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk, Psychological Foundations of Incentives, 46 EUR. ECON. REV. 
687, 713–19 (2002) (discussing the psychological process of crowding-out and its relevance to 
economics); Ernst Fehr & Bettina Rockenbach, Detrimental Effects of Sanctions on Human Altruism, 
422 NATURE 137, 140 (2003) (presenting research that “suggests that economic incentives cause mainly 
negative effects on altruistic cooperation if they come in the form of sanctions and if they are associated 
with greedy or selfish intentions”); Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter, Do Incentive Contracts Undermine 
Voluntary Cooperation? 1 (Univ. of Zurich Inst. for Empirical Research in Econ., Working Paper No. 
34, 2002) (presenting research indicating that incentive contracts undermine voluntary cooperation to 
such a degree that these contracts are less efficient than fixed-price contracts). 
 21. RICHARD M. TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL POLICY 
314 (Ann Oakley & John Ashton eds., 1997) (arguing that payments to blood donors could diminish the 
quality and quantity of donations). 
 22. Edward L. Deci, Richard Koestner & Richard M. Ryan, A Meta-Analytic Review of 
Experiments Examining the Effects of Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 
627, 658–59 (1999). 
 23. Dan Ariely, Anat Bracha & Stephan Meier, Doing Good or Doing Well? Image Motivation and 
Monetary Incentives in Behaving Prosocially 17 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos., Working Paper No. 07-9, 
2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id =1010620. 
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Aside from the crowding-out literature, the commodification scholarship 
suggests that certain attributes of one’s humanity, such as family, religion, love, 
sexuality, friendship, and altruism, are integral parts of the “self” and should 
not be a part of a commercial relationship. Commodification scholars argue that 
commodification can impact not only the meaning of such attributes for 
individuals, but also the meaning of social interactions in general.24 
In the legal context, the conventional literature on crowding-out and 
commodification usually concludes with a call for delegalization as well as a call 
for a reduction in the use of monetary incentives for activities where intrinsic 
motivation is expected to function relatively effectively.25 This solution is 
problematic, however, in those circumstances where the pro-social behavior at 
issue is costly or risky and, therefore, would justify a monetary incentive. In 
such cases, a mechanism which could provide benefits ex post without revealing 
the benefits ex ante is preferable to a situation providing no benefits at all or 
one revealing the benefits ex ante. Classic examples of this type of situation are 
organ donation and surrogacy contracting, where society sees such action as 
desirable but fears the inadvertent effect of financial incentives on the donors. 
The concerns of crowding-out and commodification are powerful in many 
countries where there is strong resistance to giving any type of economic benefit 
in such contexts. In other countries, the state financially incentivizes such 
behaviors, as they are viewed as socially desirable. Masking the law through a 
mechanism which would ensure that no price tag could be put on an organ or a 
baby ex ante, but which could still ensure certain compensation ex post, would 
provide the best of both worlds. 
An even greater challenge arises in the third type of situation where the veil 
of uncertainty is beneficial in contrast to the previous two. To encourage a 
certain behavior, the promise of a legal benefit must be communicated to 
people ex ante in a manner that encourages the action without generating a 
crowding-out effect (resulting in decreased action after the introduction of the 
legal benefit). Therefore, the main dilemma in masking the role of law in pro-
social behavior is whether it is possible to increase pro-social behavior through 
law without harming the altruistic motivations of people who choose to engage 
in such activities. 
Table 1 presents our taxonomy of the three types of legal contexts where 
partial ignorance of the law is desirable. 
 
 
 24. See Radin, supra note 12, at 1851 (arguing that the line between alienability and inalienability 
should be drawn based on the “concept of human flourishing” rather than on pure economic analysis). 
 25. See Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 13–14 (2000) 
(presenting research indicating that small penalties for undesirable behavior may increase the incidence 
of such behavior); Deci, Koestner & Ryan, supra note 22; see also Tsilly Dagan, Itemizing Personhood, 
29 VA. TAX REV. 93, 131–33 (2009) (demonstrating how in the tax law context, one can take the 
commodification literature into account without going all the way to full delegalization of non-market 
relationships). 
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Table 1: Taxonomy of Types Masking the Law 
Type The Ex Ante 
Position of the 
Law 
The Ex Post 
Position of the 
Law 
The Merits of Masking the 
Law 
Examples 
Moral Hazard and 
the Ex Post Versus 
Ex Ante Functions 
of the Law 
Prefers option 
A over option 
B 
Benefits option B 
despite ex ante 
undesirability 
Acoustic separation effect 
* Ensuring that ex post 
considerations will not 
undermine the directive 
ex ante function of the law 
* Preventing moral hazard 
* Ensuring that ex post 
benefits will be provided 
only to those who are 
morally deserving 
Bankruptcy 
law 
Ensuring Genuine 
Choices 
 
Neutral to 
options A and 
B 
Benefits options A 
or B as long as the 
selection reflects 
genuine choice 
Ensuring genuine choice: 
* Efficiency—preventing 
the distorting effect of the 
law 
* Distributive Justice—
preventing manipulative 
avoidance of legal duties 
Tax law, 
Employment 
law 
Shielding Altruistic 
Motivation 
Prefers option 
A over B 
Benefits option A 
regardless of the 
motivation 
Encouraging the 
experience of non-
instrumental factors as 
dominant, initiating pro-
social behavior; 
preventing crowding-out 
and commodification 
Surrogacy 
law; 
organ and 
blood 
donation 
III 
LEGAL UNCERTAINTY AS A VEIL OF IGNORANCE 
Part II presented a taxonomy of three types of situations where masking the 
law ex ante is desired. The nature of this legal masking was not developed, 
however. This part offers legal uncertainty as a possible solution. To make this 
argument, we rely on theories and methodologies of the behavioral analysis of 
law. First, this part looks for support in behavioral-research literature, which 
argues that when the meaning of the law is uncertain, people will likely diminish 
their reliance on legal benefits during the deliberation process. Following that 
stage, it presents an experimental survey that empirically tests these 
propositions. 
A.  Behavioral Consequences of Legal Uncertainty 
Classical expected-utility paradigms suggest that under conditions of 
uncertainty, people should multiply the likelihood of an event with their utility 
from the payout associated with that event. Further research has taken into 
account the notion of risk perception, adding another dimension to our 
understanding of one’s preference for value that derives from probabilistic 
events. Psychological research has documented the factors that moderate one’s 
attitude toward risk; famous among them is the prospect theory, which 
differentiates between attitudes toward risk with regard to gains and with 
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regard to losses.26 Furthermore, in contexts where the probability of an event 
occurring is unknown, cognitive psychologists have developed different 
concepts to account for the way people react to ambiguous information.27 In that 
regard, it is generally accepted that people have an aversion toward events with 
an ambiguous probability of occurring.28 
Amos Tversky and Eldar Shafir have termed the concept “disjunction 
effect” to account for people’s reluctance to think through different possibilities 
that may arise from events whose likelihood of occurring is unknown to them.29 
Following this line of research, Eric Van Dijk and Marcel Zeelenberg have 
shown that when people are faced with ambiguous information, they give 
possible outcomes much less weight in the decision-making process.30 
Furthermore, in some cases, ambiguous information could have the same effect 
as no information.31 Uri Gneezy and his colleagues developed the concept of the 
“uncertainty effect” to account for the fact that people are not willing to pay for 
a gift card whose benefits are uncertain, even when the expected value is much 
greater than the cost of the card. Using various techniques, they demonstrated 
that people preferred a fixed amount of money over a gamble between two 
options, even when both options were higher than the sum of money offered in 
the fixed option.32 Thus, even when the least desired outcome was greater than 
the fixed option, it was less likely to be preferred in both gambling settings and 
incentive settings. This effect, combined with the disjunction effect discussed 
above, suggests that by making legal benefits ambiguous, we may cause people 
to downplay their importance rather than engage in probabilistic calculation of 
outcomes, an option which is obviously less desirable for the argument we wish 
to develop in this paper. 
In contrast to the wealth and variety of research conducted in psychology, 
research on decision-making under uncertainty in law has focused only on 
limited aspects of uncertainty. Many of the papers on uncertainty in law are 
focused on criticizing Gary Becker’s view on deterrence.33 Many have criticized 
 
 26. See generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision 
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979). 
 27. See Deborah Frisch & Jonathan Baron, Ambiguity and Rationality, 1 J. BEHAV. DECISION 
MAKING 149, 152 (1988) (discussing the definition of ambiguity). 
 28. Gideon Keren & Léonie E.M. Gerritsen, On the Robustness and Possible Accounts of 
Ambiguity Aversion, 103 ACTA PSYCHOL. 149, 169–71 (1999) (recognizing the phenomenon of 
ambiguity avoidance and discussing possible explanations). 
 29. Amos Tversky & Eldar Shafir, The Disjunction Effect in Choice Under Uncertainty, 3 
PSYCHOL. SCI. 305, 306 (1992). It should be admitted that the disjunction effect may be limited to 
ambiguity with regard to a specific event, which is narrower than the broader claim we wish to develop 
in our project. 
 30. See Eric Van Dijk & Marcel Zeelenberg, The Discounting of Ambiguous Information in 
Economic Decision Making, 16 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 341, 350–51 (2003). 
 31. See id. at 342. 
 32. Uri Gneezy et al., The Uncertainty Effect: When a Risky Prospect Is Valued Less Than Its Worst 
Possible Outcome, 121 Q.J. ECON. 1283, 1284 (2006). 
 33. See Becker, supra note 4, at 183–84 (presenting analysis of probability of conviction, length of 
punishment, and other variables as determinants of number of criminal offenses). 
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the Becker model for treating changes in the severity of a sanction and in the 
probability of detection as identical, arguing that potential criminals are more 
sensitive to changes in the probability of detection than to changes in the size of 
a sanction.34 
In a series of two papers, Alon Harel and his colleagues employ insights 
from cognitive psychology to compare the way potential criminals treat 
uncertainty concerning sanction size and the probability of detection.35 These 
studies focus mainly on how individuals evaluate the probability of detection in 
a criminal-law context. Additionally, there are some lines of research that focus 
on behavioral effects of legal ambiguity in the civil context.36 In the contexts of 
tax law and information sharing, researchers have focused on how the law can 
help people overcome their ambiguity aversion when avoiding a behavior is 
inefficient.37 
In the legal context, some research, while not using the terminology of 
disjunction, suggests that legal uncertainty decreases the influence of the law on 
people’s decision-making beyond what would have been predicted under utility 
theory and risk-aversion research. Viewing legal uncertainty as different from 
uncertainty in decision-making, Yuval Feldman and Alon Harel have shown 
that when faced with legal ambiguity, people rely primarily on social norms to 
decide how to behave.38 Their paper demonstrates that people are strategic in 
their choice of social reference group and that legal ambiguity is a key factor in 
moderating reliance on the behavior of others. Feldman and Doron Teichman 
have shown the difference between uncertainty in a law’s meaning and 
uncertainty in enforcement. They have demonstrated empirically that the legal 
uncertainty affected not only the instrumental, deterrence-related effects of law, 
but also the expressive meaning of the law.39 Their paper demonstrates how the 
type of law as well as its association with uncertainty moderates the effect of 
legal uncertainty on behavior. 
Although these studies focus on how uncertainty leads people to understand 
the law differently, they do not directly address the disjunction effect, whereby 
uncertainty causes people to ignore the law in full or in part. In this paper, we 
 
 34. See, e.g., Harold G. Grasmick & George J. Bryjak, The Deterrent Effect of Perceived Severity of 
Punishment, 59 SOC. FORCES 471, 486 (1980–1981) (suggesting that perceived severity has significant 
deterrent effect at relatively high levels of perceived certainty). 
 35. Harel & Segal, supra note 3; Tom Baker, Alon Harel & Tamar Kugler, The Virtues of 
Uncertainty in Law: An Experimental Approach, 89 IOWA L. REV. 443, 486–87 (2004). 
 36. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Death, Taxes and Cognition, 81 N.C. L. REV. 567, 578–93 (2003) 
(discussing people’s behavior with regard to estate-tax planning). 
 37. See Amitai Aviram & Avishalom Tor, Overcoming Impediments to Information Sharing, 55 
ALA. L. REV. 231, 248–50 (2004); Terrance R. Chorvat, Ambiguity and Income Taxation, 23 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 617, 640–45 (2002) (advocating a low or zero tax rate for foreign investments to overcome 
investors’ ambiguity-based preference for domestic funds). 
 38. Yuval Feldman & Alon Harel, Social Norms, Self-Interest and Ambiguity of Legal Norms: An 
Experimental Analysis of the Rule vs. Standard Dilemma, 4 REV. L. & ECON. 81, 98–99 (2008). 
 39. Yuval Feldman & Doron Teichman, Are All Legal Probabilities Created Equal?, 84 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 980, 985 (2009). 
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suggest a more dramatic change in the way people react to legal uncertainty 
than has been argued for in the disjunction effect suggested by Tversky and 
Shafir40 or the uncertainty effect suggested by Gneezy and his colleagues.41 More 
specifically, we argue that legal ambiguity might cause people to undermine 
their consideration for the law altogether and resort to alternative motivational 
causes—their true preferences. Thus, our focus is not on how people make 
decisions under conditions of uncertainty, but rather how people might avoid 
taking legality of their actions into account and choose alternative paths of 
behavior when the law cannot give them certainty. Furthermore, in contrast to 
the surveyed literature on uncertainty in law that focuses mainly on legal costs 
and the deterrent power of ambiguity, our focus is on legal benefits and, hence, 
transcends the deterrence-related discussion of ambiguity. We aim to 
demonstrate empirically that legal uncertainty can mask some of the distorting 
ex ante effects of the law. If indeed we succeed, our effort to provide a 
mechanism which could mask the law ex ante will likely receive some 
behavioral support. 
B.  Empirical Demonstration 
Based on the review of literature on the disjunction effect, the following 
empirical demonstration explores, in a legal context, the gap between the 
impact of certain probabilistic and ambiguous legal benefits on one’s legal 
preferences. To achieve this goal, we randomly divided our sample into four 
groups. Each group was presented with an identical employment-law dilemma 
that differed only in the likelihood of getting a legal benefit associated with 
choosing a certain type of legal regime. The goal was to compare between the 
influence of certain, probabilistic, and ambiguous legal benefits relative to a 
situation where no legal benefit was offered.42 
1.  Sample and Design 
The data collection method was web-based, using the survey firm, Panels. 
The firm holds a panel of volunteers who earn online rewards in return for 
filling out a survey. The sample of the survey was drawn from a diverse, 
representative panel of 438 Israeli adults. All participants were presented with 
the following identical scenario, which is based on a typical employment-law 
dilemma: 
Assume that you are looking for an accountant for a firm that you own. You wonder 
whether it makes more sense to employ him as your employee or as a contractor. If 
you choose the first route, then you gain greater ability to supervise his working hours 
and greater control over the way the work is being done. In contrast, if you choose the 
second option, then the payment will be based on output, but you will not have any 
control over the working hours or the way the work will be done. 
 
 40. See Tversky & Shafir, supra note 29. 
 41. See Gneezy et al., supra note 32. 
 42. When referring to legal benefits, we include also saving future legal costs. 
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 Following this description, which was the same for all subgroups of the 
sample, an experimental manipulation took place. In this manipulation, the 
legal ramifications of choosing to take the second route were phrased in four 
different ways, each given to one of the four randomly selected subgroups of 
the sample: 
1.  No external rewards mentioned. In this group, no reference to legal 
benefits was made, and participants were expected to make their decision based 
on organizational differences between the two types of employment. 
2.  Legal reward under the condition of ambiguity. In this group, 
participants were told the following: 
Assume that, according to the law that regulates employment relations in Israel, if you 
choose to employ the accountant as a contractor rather than as an employee, you could 
save 5,000 NIS per month because of various legal benefits you will not need to pay 
(e.g. employer’s tax, severance pay, and other social benefits). Nonetheless, there is a 
possibility that the court will intervene and would declare that the accountant is your 
employee and then you will save nothing on legal grounds. 
3.  Legal reward under the condition of uncertainty, with probabilities 
provided. In this group, participants were told the following: 
Assume that, according to the law that regulates employment relations in Israel, if you 
choose to employ the accountant as a contractor rather than as an employee, you 
could save 5,000 NIS per month because of various legal benefits you will not need to 
pay (e.g. employer’s tax, severance pay, and other social benefits). Nonetheless, there 
is an 80%43 chance that the court will intervene and would declare that the accountant 
is your employee and then you will save nothing on legal grounds. 
4.  Certain external rewards. In this group, participants were told the 
following: 
Assume that, according to the law that regulates employment relations in Israel, if you 
choose to employ the accountant as a contractor rather than as an employee, you 
would certainly save 1,000 NIS per month because of various legal benefits you will 
not need to pay (e.g. employer’s tax, severance pay, and other social benefits). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 43. We recognize that using low probabilities limits the ability of our findings to generalize in terms 
of other situations with higher probabilities. 
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For each factual scenario and legal mechanism, we measured the following 
variables:44 
1.  Intention45 of self and others to choose a certain employment 
pattern 
2.  Whether the legal arrangement taken is profitable and fair 
from the employee perspective 
3.  What the most suitable legal arrangement for the described 
setting would be 
4.  Risk attitudes 
5.  Demographics 
2.  Findings 
a.  Effect of Certainty on Self Versus Others  
We start our analysis by examining whether the different ways of framing 
the certainty of legal benefits affected (1) what participants themselves would 
choose and (2) what participants expected that others would choose. Using an 
“Analysis of Variance”46 controlling for demographics and attitudes toward risk 
(MANCOVA47),48 we find that the legal instrument subgroups did indeed differ 
significantly with regard to the measures of the employment preference.49 
Univariate tests revealed that the effect was significant for both measures of the 
preferred form of employment,50 with a higher preference for employing a 
salaried employee found within the No External Reward scenario (No External 
 
 44. In addition, we have also measured an elaborate demographic profile to account for risk 
preferences. This last factor was used as the control in all of the presented analyses. 
 45. We rely on the concept of intention developed by Icek Ajzen. See Icek Ajzen, The Theory of 
Planned Behavior, 50 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 179, 181 (1991) (“Intentions are 
assumed to capture the motivational factors that influence a behavior; they are indications of how hard 
people are willing to try, of how much of an effort they are planning to exert, in order to perform the 
behavior.”). 
 46. ANOVA, a univariate analysis of variance, aims to identify the sources of variance among 
participants. In contrast to MANOVA, ANOVA involves only one dependent variable. 
 47. MANCOVA and ANCOVA are similar procedures to MANOVA and ANOVA, respectively. 
The major difference is that MANCOVA and ANCOVA control for the influence of a supplementary 
independent variable (a covariate) such as demographics and attitudes toward risk. 
 48. While the one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed that the legal instrument 
subgroups did not differ significantly on the risk-attitudes measure, the measure, which was expected to 
be associated with the outcome factors, was included as a covariate in the analyses to be reported. A 
similar pattern of results emerged without covariating for the risk attitudes and, therefore, the possible 
effect of the measure as a competing explanation for the participants’ outcomes was substantially 
reduced. Covariating for the three background variables revealed similar patterns of results unless 
reported otherwise. 
 49. Multivariate F(6, 864)=7.45, p<.001, η2=.05. 
 50. Self as an Employer: F(3, 433)=6.79, p<.001, η2=.04; The Majority as an Employer: F (3, 
433)=12.20, p<.001, η2=.08. 
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Reward), followed by the Legal Reward Under the Condition of Ambiguity 
scenario (Ambiguous Reward), the External Reward—Probabilistic Reasoning 
scenario (Probabilistic Reward), and the Certain External Reward scenario 
(Certain Reward). 
In accordance with the hypothesis,51 we found that for the measure of self-
decision, the scenarios of No External Reward and Probabilistic Reward 
generated a significantly higher preference for the salaried employee than did 
the Certain Reward (all p’s < .05). We found that for the measure of the 
decision participants expected others to make, however, the No External 
Reward scenario generated a significantly higher preference for occupying a 
salaried employee than did the scenarios of Ambiguous Reward, Probabilistic 
Reward, and Certain Reward (all p’s < .05). This gap in the ambiguity effect 
might be related to the fact that part of the reason for ambiguity aversion is 
related to a self-defense mechanism. Thus, when asked to evaluate the behavior 
of others, the discount associated with an ambiguity aversion is smaller.52 
Table 2 presents the adjusted mean scores (M) and standard deviations 
(SD) of the measures of the preferred form of employment as a function of the 
legal instrument. Figure 1 presents the ranking of the legal instruments with 
regard to these measures. 
 
Table 2: The Adjusted Mean Scores and Standard Deviations of the 
Measures of the Preferred Employment Format as a Function of the Legal 
Instrument 
 The Legal Instrument 
 No Reward Ambiguous 
Reward 
Probabilistic 
Reward 
Certain 
Reward 
Measures of the 
Preferred 
Occupational 
Arrangement 
M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Self (Intention) 63.42 27.47 59.39 27.12 58.64 27.49 47.05 31.14 
Most Others 62.00 24.30 49.02 27.76 46.23 27.05 40.84 29.00 
Comment: Controlling for the level of tendency for taking risks. 
  
 
 
 
 51. This hypothesis is based on the Bonferroni post-hoc test, which helps to address the problem of 
multiple comparisons. 
 52. For a discussion of the sources of the “self-other gap,” see Nicholas Epley & David Dunning, 
Feeling “Holier Than Thou”: Are Self-Serving Assessments Produced by Errors in Self- or Social 
Prediction?, 79 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 861, 861–62 (2000) (discussing why people tend to 
hold more charitable views of themselves than of others). For a discussion of the gap in the legal 
context, see Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative Effectiveness of 
Rewards, Liabilities, Duties and Protections for Reporting Illegality, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1151, 1153–54 
(2010) (examining the effect of various regulatory mechanisms on social enforcement patterns). 
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Figure 1: Preferred Legal Arrangement (Self) 
 
 Therefore, as one can see from the analysis and from the graph, our 
hypothesis was confirmed: when legal benefits are provided through uncertain 
rules, their effect on the reported intention of individuals will be diminished. 
Not only did certain legal benefits have a stronger effect on participants’ 
decisions than uncertain legal benefits, but the effects of both probabilistic and 
ambiguous legal benefits were no stronger than the effect of no legal benefit. 
While the weak effect of the Ambiguous Reward was expected according to the 
behavioral literature, the theoretical basis for the limited effect of the 
Probabilistic Reward was weaker. This effect could be explained by the 
uniqueness of legal uncertainty, which was shown above to have different 
effects than typical ambiguous information.53 
 
 53. See Feldman & Teichman, supra note 39, at 1009–11 (finding that because of law’s expressive 
nature, clear law significantly affects behavior even if enforcement is uncertain or unlikely). 
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b.  Who Is More Likely To Be Affected by Certainty?  
By examining whether the arrangement was desirable to employers, we can 
identify how much people care about employees in their choice of employment 
format. Examining the interaction between this factor and the manipulated 
level of certainty of legal benefits, using a two-way MANCOVA, reveals the 
following interesting interaction: the effect of the certainty of the law on the 
measures of the preference of the form of employment changed according to 
the level of the perceived desirability of the arrangement from the employee’s 
perspective. 
We divided our sample based on their evaluation of the desirability of their 
chosen legal arrangement from the perspective of the employee.54 Only among 
participants with a low or an intermediate positive perception of the 
arrangement did the legal instrument have a significant effect on their choice.55 
Among participants with a low positive perception of the arrangement (that is, 
those who did not care at all about the employee), the No External Reward 
scenario generated a significantly higher “self” preference of employing a 
salaried employee than did the scenario of Certain Reward.56 An even stronger 
effect of certainty was found with regard to those with an intermediate positive 
perception of the arrangement (that is, those who had a moderate regard for 
the interest of their employee). All three legal rules (No External Reward, 
Ambiguous Reward, and Probabilistic Reward) generated a significantly higher 
“self” preference for the salaried employee than did the scenario of Certain 
Reward.57 Among participants with a high positive perception of the 
arrangement from the employee perspective, however, the certainty did not 
have a significant effect on the measure (p > .05). 
Figures 2–4 present the interaction effect between the certainty of the law 
and the perceived desirability of the arrangement from the employee’s 
perspective on the measures of the preference of the employment format 
(n=438). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 54. Participants were divided into three subgroups according to the thirty-third and sixty-sixth 
percentiles of the measure of the perception of the arrangement from the employee’s perspective. Two 
items were used to build this factor: q 4 (whether the chosen arrangement is profitable for the 
employee) and q 8 (whether the chosen arrangement is fair for the employee). 
 55. These tests are based on the linearly independent pairwise comparisons among the estimated 
marginal means. 
 56. F(3, 425)=2.86, p<.05, η2=.02. 
 57. F(3, 425)=3.24, p<.05, η2=.02. 
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Figure 2: Preference for the Contractor Arrangement Within the Low 
Perceived Desirability Subgroup 
 
 
Figure 3: Preference for the Contractor Arrangement Within the 
Intermediate Perceived Desirability Subgroup 
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Figure 4: Preference for the Contractor Arrangement Within the High 
Perceived Desirability Subgroup 
 
 
For participants who are internally motivated and who have high regard for 
the employee, neither the law nor its certainty affected their choice. In our 
terminology, such people’s “original experience” will not be affected even by a 
certain law; thus, creating a veil of ignorance by legislating uncertain law is not 
needed. This is not the case with regard to people who have no regard for their 
employee or, especially, moderate (or intermediate) regard for their employee. 
For those two categories, we see that only legal certainty can shift their choice. 
For such people, uncertainty was shown to be an effective tool in masking the 
ability of ex post legal benefits to alter behavior. 
A similar finding emerged when an interaction was examined with the factor 
of “level of saving needed” (in terms of salary) for choosing the employee–
contractor option. This factor aimed at identifying the strength of participants’ 
preferences for either one of the employment formats offered to them. 
The two-way MANCOVA revealed that the effect of the legal instrument 
on the measures of the preference of the employment format changed 
according to the level of the estimated reduction in the employee’s wage.58 Only 
among participants with a low estimated reduction in the employee’s wage did 
the legal instrument have a significant effect on their choice of legal 
 
 58. Participants were divided into three subgroups according to the thirty-third and sixty-sixth 
percentiles of the measure of the perceived reduction in the employee’s wage. 
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arrangement,59 with the conditions of No External Reward, Ambiguous Reward, 
and Probabilistic Reward generating a significantly higher preference for the 
salaried employee than the Certain Reward.60 Among participants with an 
intermediate or a high estimated reduction in the employee’s wage, the 
variation in the certainty of the law did not have a significant effect on the 
measure (p’s > .05). 
Thus, we see a similar interaction between level of certainty and strength of 
preferences, as in the previous analysis. When participants require moderate to 
high changes in costs to change their preferences, it is more difficult for either 
law or certainty to alter their preferences.61 These two interactions, while 
enriching our understanding of the mechanism through which certainty 
operates, limit our ability to generalize in our argument, as they suggest that the 
main effect of certainty discussed in the beginning of the findings section could 
be attributed to certain types of people. 
c.  Subjective Experience of Uncertainty  
Finally, we move on to explore the effect of certainty on one’s experience 
through a “within subject” design rather than a “between subject” design. In 
this part of the study, we asked participants to consciously ignore the benefits 
that they had just read. MANCOVA analysis shows that the legal instrument 
subgroups62 differed significantly with regard to the measure of the preference 
of the employment format under the absence of economic considerations.63 In 
accordance with the hypothesis, we found that the Certain Reward scenario 
generated a significantly higher preference for employing a salaried employee 
than did the two conditions of uncertainty. 
This finding is consistent with our argument that uncertain rules are less 
likely to interfere with one’s experience. Participants who were exposed to a 
certain legal benefit that emerged from the law were unable to ignore this 
benefit when requested to do so. Those participants who were asked to ignore 
an uncertain benefit and even a probabilistic one, however, were more likely to 
succeed in doing so. 
Next, we reexamined the subjective experience of participants through the 
“within subject” design. Here, participants’ success in ignoring the effect of the 
law was compared with their original choice across four experimental 
conditions. 
 
 59. These tests are based on the linearly independent pairwise comparisons among the estimated 
marginal means. 
 60. F(3, 425)=4.55, p<.01, η2=.03. 
 61. Note that with regard to the second interaction, certainty could not have had an effect when 
neither type of law differed significantly from the control group for the moderate- to high-level 
intensity of preferences. 
 62. Three subgroups were compared: High External Reward under Uncertainty, High External 
Reward–Probabilistic Reasoning, and External Reward with Certain Probability. 
 63. F(2, 324)=5.52, p<.01, η2=.03. 
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To examine this fact, we looked at the participants’ responses when asked to 
ignore the legal benefits associated with their choice and compared it to their 
actual choice, which was done in response to the different framings of the law. 
In the vignettes that participants were asked to read, a two-way MANCOVA 
with repeated measures for the type of the preference of the employment 
format with and without reference to the legal benefits was mentioned, 
indicating a significant gap between the two measures.64 
More importantly, a significant interactive effect was found between the 
preference of the employment format and the legal instrument.65 Within the 
Certain Reward condition, the effect of the type of the preference of the 
employment format was found to be significant.66 With regard to the other two 
uncertainty conditions, however, there was no change when participants were 
asked to note the preferences without taking into account the legal benefit. 
Figure 5 presents the adjusted mean scores of the two measures as a function of 
the legal instrument. 
 
Figure 5: The Adjusted Mean Scores for the Measures of the Preference of 
the Employment Format as a Function of the Observed or Expected Preference 
and of the Legal Instrument (n=438).  
 
 
 
 
 
 64. F(1, 324)=19.10, p<.001, η2=.06; Expected Preference: M=72.62, SD=22.68; Observed Preference: 
M=46.96, SD=31.14. 
 65. F(2, 324)=15.63, p<.001, η2=.09. 
 66. F(1, 324)=62.02, p<.001, η2=.16. 
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 When participants were asked to ignore the effect of a certain legal benefit, 
there was a big shift in their behavior, which was even stronger than the 
experimental effect of legal benefits. In contrast, under both conditions of 
uncertainty, when participants were asked to ignore the effect of the law, they 
did not make any significant change in their choices. This suggests not only that 
uncertainty can mask the ex ante effect of law, but also, even in their own 
subjective experience, the participants did not feel the need to adjust their true 
preferences when they were asked to ignore an uncertain benefit. 
C.  Intermediate Summary: The Role of Uncertainty Within the Law 
The empirical demonstration has led to three main findings regarding the 
ways in which legal uncertainty causes people to behave according to their true 
preferences. First, we have seen that getting legal benefits under conditions of 
uncertainty, whether probabilities were provided or not, did not have a 
significant effect on participants’ preferences for an employment arrangement. 
Participants’ behavior was less affected by the benefits of law when those 
benefits were uncertain. While the lack of effect of ambiguous legal benefits 
was expected according to theories of ambiguity aversion, disjunction effect, 
and uncertainty effect, it was less expected with regard to probabilistic 
benefits.67 Because attitudes for risk were controlled for, it is unlikely that risk 
aversion could explain this effect. It is possible that this effect replicates some of 
the findings of Feldman and Teichman with regard to the uniqueness of legal 
uncertainty and the diminishing expressive power that law has in such contexts, 
even when probabilities are given.68 It is also possible that even when 
probabilities are given, especially when they are low (for example, twenty 
percent), the legal benefit is not seen by people as worth considering in their 
own decision-making. Such effect is especially anticipated when people have 
other indicators on how to decide. In contrast to the classic decision-under-
uncertainty studies, where the individual is required to give a dollar value to a 
probabilistic value, here, people have an option to avoid this tedious process by 
following their true desires. 
Another caveat is that the effect of certainty works differently with regard 
to self-decision and with regard to what participants thought others would do. 
Here, probabilistic benefits and, to a lesser extent, ambiguous benefits, did have 
an effect on participants’ evaluations of what type of arrangements people 
might choose. 
This caveat is important for several reasons. First, it demonstrates that the 
manipulation was working well, for only in the uncertain groups was there a 
difference between what people wanted to do and what people thought others 
would do. Second, it suggests the motivational nature of ambiguity avoidance is 
 
 67. This second type of uncertain benefit was slightly stronger than the first type, but still no 
significant effect was present. 
 68. See Feldman & Teichman, supra note 39, at 1010–11. 
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weaker with regard to a decision not taken by the individual himself or herself. 
Therefore, in those areas where we are not interested in affecting the individual 
but rather social norms, ambiguity is expected to be less effective in masking the 
law. 
Our second finding is related to the interaction between the effect of 
uncertainty and the strength of an individual’s preference for one of the 
employment arrangements. We have shown that for participants who are 
internally motivated and have high regard for the employee, neither the law nor 
its certainty affected their choice. For such people, their “authentic experience” 
was not affected by certainty in the law. This is not so for people who have little 
regard for employees or have moderate regard for employee interests. For 
those two categories of participants, we see the benefits of uncertainty as a 
mask on the law. Certain legal benefits shifted their choice, while uncertain law, 
either ambiguous or probabilistic, did not have a significant effect on the choice 
of occupational arrangement. Therefore, for people with weak to moderate 
regard for employees, uncertainty was an effective tool in masking the ability of 
the law to alter behavior. A similar effect was found when the analysis was 
conducted with regard to the level of reduction in salary costs needed for 
employers to choose the employee’s status. 
Third, when participants were asked to ignore the effect of certain legal 
benefits, there was a substantial shift in their behavior, which was even stronger 
than the original experimental effect of legal benefits. This effect might be 
related to the “endowment effect,” where maintaining a legal right one already 
possesses is valued more highly than obtaining a new legal right that one was 
never entitled to before. In contrast, under both conditions of uncertainty, when 
participants were asked to ignore the effect of the law, they did not make any 
significant change in their choices. This suggests that even in their own 
subjective experience, they did not feel the need to adjust their true preferences 
when they were asked to ignore an uncertain legal benefit. This last finding 
completes our understanding of the importance of uncertainty in weakening 
law’s influence on people’s experience and behavior. 
Uncertainty was shown to be, at least in an artificial replication of real-life 
decision-making, significantly different than certain legal benefits. This fact 
demonstrates the potential for using uncertainty to mask the ex ante effect of 
law in the legal areas discussed above. Obviously, there are important 
limitations that we need to consider when attempting to use data taken from 
web-based experimental surveys, which basically only measure attitudes about 
real-life legal settings. In our experimental design, people did not risk anything 
in their responses and were faced with a somewhat unrealistic dichotomous 
dilemma. Nonetheless, as an empirical demonstration for the difference in 
treatment of uncertain and ambiguous legal benefits, we do believe that our 
study contributes to the theoretical argument of this paper. 
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IV 
THE INADVERTENT CONSEQUENCES OF LEGAL UNCERTAINTY 
Part III demonstrated that uncertainty might serve as a tool to mask the 
parts of the law which are shown to be disruptive. However, masking the law is 
not always a desirable goal. Furthermore, even in those situations where 
masking the law is socially desirable, uncertainty still carries some inadvertent 
effects which may limit its usage. Part IV presents these inadvertent effects and 
balances them with the advantages of uncertainty. 
A.  Excessive Litigation 
According to conventional wisdom, uncertainty is one of the causes for 
excessive and inefficient litigation.69 Recent research reveals, however, a more 
complex picture of the relationship between uncertainty and litigation. In some 
circumstances, due to risk and ambiguity aversion, uncertainty may encourage 
compromise. Furthermore, in ongoing relationships, uncertainty may lead 
litigants to neglect their legal rights and to focus instead on their future needs 
and preferences.70 Given the complex and rich effects of uncertainty, the fear 
from excessive litigation should not prevent the policy maker from exploring 
the benefits of uncertainty. 
B.  Distributive Concerns 
The effect of uncertainty may vary among people of different educational 
and socioeconomic statuses. Variation may occur ex ante, ex post, or during the 
period in between. This may have a significant distributive justice effect that 
lawmakers should be taking into account. 
1.  The Ex Ante Distributive Effect on Uncertainty 
According to our analysis, legal uncertainty provides the mechanism for 
masking the legal consequences of an action and, therefore, enhances 
authenticity. Uncertainty, however, never achieves the pure effect of masking 
the law, as people gather some information about courts’ ex post decisions 
regarding the uncertain rules. This ex post information is not equally accessed 
and understood by everyone. “Repeat players” are naturally more exposed to 
such information and are usually more motivated to gather and analyze the ex 
 
 69. See, e.g., Michael S. Wilk & Rik H. Zafar, Mediation of a Bankruptcy Case, 22 AM. BANKR. 
INST. J. 12, 60 (2003) (“[M]ediation gives the parties the control of determining the outcome of the 
dispute and avoids the uncertainty inherent in all litigation.”). In the context of contract law, see 
Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814, 
836–37 (2006) (discussing the trade-offs between precise terms, which are more costly to negotiate, and 
vague terms, which may lead to inefficient litigation). 
 70. See, e.g., Claire A. Hill, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Lawsuit: A Social Norms Theory of 
Incomplete Contracts, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 191, 218 (2009) (arguing that parties strengthen their 
relationships by jointly accepting vulnerability “to costly and uncertain enforcement” through 
ambiguous contract terms). 
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post information. Thus, uncertain rules may increase the power gap between 
repeat players and “first-timers.”71 
Although asymmetric information has a clear distributive effect that should 
be taken into account, uncertainty does not necessarily work against 
economically weaker parties. First, the premise that both first-timers and repeat 
players are familiar with the legal implications of certain rules is not always 
true. In some cases, first-timers or economically weaker parties are wholly 
ignorant about the content of the law. In those cases, uncertainty reduces the 
knowledge advantage rather than increase it. 
Second, making it harder for people to gather full knowledge of the law ex 
ante will primarily harm the more affluent members of society. After all, the 
employers or rich taxpayers are among the first of those who usually attempt to 
behave strategically with regard to the law.72 This should work in the favor of 
first-timers, such as economically weaker parties. 
Finally and most importantly, even if repeat players get legal advice ex ante, 
which could transform an ambiguous situation into a probabilistic one, our 
findings demonstrate that in the legal context, the discount for ambiguous legal 
information works even when the legal reward is probabilistic. This means that 
even if repeat players do indeed have more information ex ante about the 
possible results of litigation than do first-timers, the disjunction effect still 
undermines the practical results of these differences. Furthermore, our findings 
reveal that the disjunction effect does not interact with participants’ risk 
attitude. This might narrow the distributive effect, which could be attributed to 
the gap in attitudes toward risk-taking among participants. 
2.  Bargaining in the Shadow of Uncertainty 
We have argued that ex ante ambiguity will not result in a systematic 
distributive effect in favor of the economically superior parties even in cases of 
asymmetric information and differences in risk-taking. Yet, the ex ante 
advantage of uncertainty may carry inadvertent normative and behavioral 
effects with regard to ex post litigation decisions. From a normative perspective, 
in the ex post stage, the need to maintain ex ante genuine choice is no longer 
present, and the focus moves to ensuring that weaker parties will be able to 
protect their legal rights.73 On the behavioral front, when an individual decides 
whether to engage in ex post litigation, the legal ambiguity may be substituted 
for non-legal considerations. That is why in this stage, there is a need to refine 
our argument for masking the law, keeping in mind legal rights. 
 
 71. See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal 
Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97–104 (1974–1975) (contrasting the characteristics of and strategies 
used by “repeat players” and “one-shotters”). 
 72. See Craswell & Calfee, supra note 1 (explaining the effects of uncertainty in terms of 
deterrence); Harel & Segal, supra note 3 (arguing that uncertainty enhances deterrence). 
 73. William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, 
Blaming, Claiming . . ., 15 L. & SOC’Y REV. 631, 636–37 (1980–1981). 
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For example, in the labor-law context, the uncertainty regarding the legal 
status of an employee may deter him from suing to protect his legal rights ex 
post. Furthermore, in the ex post situation, when the focus of both sides of an 
employment relationship is on protecting their own legal rights, there is no 
room, either behaviorally or normatively, for masking or decreasing legal 
considerations.74 Thus, legal ambiguity may undermine the optimal functioning 
of the law without giving rise to an alternative mode of decision-making. 
An additional danger arises when one’s uncertainty regarding legal rights 
may intensify the power gap among parties. For example, under the regime we 
advocate, an employee in the context of labor law or a couple in the context of 
spousal relationships75 may face uncertainty with regard to their legal rights. To 
be sure, when the legal rights associated with the exit options of the individual 
are uncertain, the power relations within the relationship become more 
problematic.76 Those employees or couples may find themselves in an inferior 
position as a result of the uncertainty in the law. 
In sum, despite our general support of uncertainty, we believe that its 
benefits should be balanced against its negative distributive-justice 
consequences. Although we do not offer a complete solution to this situation, 
the following part will demonstrate a possible balance between uncertainty and 
its potential negative distributive-justice implications in various legal fields, 
including labor law, tax law, family law, and health law. 
V 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS: THE ROLE OF UNCERTAINTY WITHIN THE LAW 
A.  Rules Versus Standards 
In law and economics literature, much attention has been paid to the 
difference between “standards” and “rules.”77 Standards and rules can be 
depicted as two extremes in a one-dimensional space representing the degree of 
specificity of legal norms. Both standards and rules are legal norms that 
adjudicators use to direct actions. Standards are open-ended legal norms, 
allowing the adjudicator to make fact-specific determinations, such as whether a 
driver used “reasonable care” in a given situation. A rule, conversely, imposes 
stricter limits on the discretion of the adjudicator. 
 
 74. There is an additional concern that should be taken into account regarding the influence of 
cognitive biases like the disjunction effect on decision-making in large organizations. See Lauren B. 
Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: Organizational Mediation of Civil Rights Law, 97 
AM. J. SOC. 1531, 1568 (1992) (demonstrating that where the law is uncertain, large organizations tend 
to create structural and cultural environments that discourage employees from exercising their rights). 
 75. For more details, see infra Part V.B.1 (discussing the certainty in cohabitation law). 
 76. See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE 
IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS AND STATES (1970) (discussing and comparing exit options of various 
actors in various settings). 
 77. See generally Kaplow, supra note 2; Sunstein, supra note 1. 
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The use of rules and standards involves different costs. In the view of law 
and economics theorists, the choice between them should be determined by 
these costs.78 The cost of producing standards is typically lower than rules, but 
the former has higher enforcement and compliance costs. Promulgating the 
standard “to take reasonable care in all matters” is extremely easy and does not 
generate much cost. Applying this standard in practice, however, may generate 
significant costs for judges, for example, who have to determine whether a 
plaintiff or defendant complied with a standard, and for defendants, who have 
to determine which level of precaution is necessary to escape liability. In the 
case of specific legal norms (that is, rules), the relative size of costs is exactly the 
opposite. The legislature incurs larger costs in creating a rule than in creating a 
standard, as it has to specify more precisely the scope of the rule and the 
consequences of its violation. On the other hand, rules are typically easier to 
apply than standards. In addition, the costs of legal advice are lower, and it is 
easier for citizens to predict their effects and act accordingly.79 
While the efficiency consideration is straightforward, the choice between using 
standards and rules is difficult in the real world. The existing literature on the rule–
standard distinction identifies the choice between rules and standards as founded 
on the frequency of the regulated activities. Rules are preferable when the 
regulated activity is frequent, whereas standards do best when behavior varies so 
greatly that any particular scenario is rare. Designing a rule for a rare scenario is 
too costly and the use of standards is, therefore, preferred. Since rules are more 
expensive to create, the costs are worthwhile only when the regulated activity 
occurs frequently.80 
Recently, Feldman and Harel offered a behavioral case for use of legal 
rules. Because the effect of social norms on compliance is far greater with 
regard to standards than to rules, they suggest that the existence and the nature 
of prevailing social norms should be taken into account when determining the 
desirable degree of specificity in legal norms. Specifically, they argue that when 
social norms of noncompliance serve individuals’ self-interest, legal rules are 
preferable to legal standards as a tool to achieve compliance.81 
In this article, we use similar logic but approach it from the opposite 
direction. When social norms align with the law, we prefer legal standards over 
rules so that non-legal factors will be dominant in the decision-making process. 
Naturally, giving judges greater flexibility in adjudicating the law is likely to 
increase ex ante ambiguity, which is desirable in those situations. Furthermore, 
with regard to the third type and according to our model, when uncertainty is 
 
 78. See Kaplow, supra note 2, at 619–20. 
 79. Of course there could be relevant non-economic considerations. The rule of law is often 
considered a virtue of a legal system irrespective of its economic ramifications. Cf. Baker, Harel & 
Kugler, supra note 35, at 472 (non-economic considerations are often provided to justify the use of 
standards on the grounds that rules are too rigid and therefore unjust). 
 80. Kaplow, supra note 2, at 563. 
 81. Feldman & Harel, supra note 38, at 112. 
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geared toward preventing crowding-out, using standards may have an 
additional justification. Standards may be the optimal solution when the aim is 
encouraging state policies of certain pro-social activities, such as organ 
donations, without undermining the social capital which underlies such 
activities. 
B.  Moral Hazard and the Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Distinction 
In order to demonstrate the use of uncertainty in type-one scenarios, where 
uncertainty may prevent moral hazards, we have chosen examples from family 
law and bankruptcy law for discussion. 
1.  The Marriage–Cohabitation Distinction 
For over two hundred years, civil marriage has been a recognized legal 
institution in Western culture. During this period, it has been almost undisputed 
that the law should distinguish between married spouses and unmarried 
cohabitants,82 both in terms of their mutual duties (“the internal dimension”), as 
well as in terms of their rights and privileges against the state and other entities 
external to their relationships (“the external dimension”). In recent decades, 
most Western legal systems have started to provide certain legal rights to 
unmarried cohabitants. Yet in most legal systems, the legal preference for 
married couples is still deeply rooted.83 
Traditionally, the preference for marriage has been based mainly on moral–
religious foundations. In recent years, however, a set of secular arguments have 
developed to justify the promotion of marriage.84 At the heart of those 
arguments is the understanding that marriage is a signal for high-level 
commitment.85 
The first set of arguments focuses on the interests of the couple. In recent 
years, research has demonstrated that from psychological and economic 
perspectives, involvement in an intimate relationship with a long-term 
commitment has significant value for the emotional and financial well-being of 
the individual, for the individual’s self-image, and for the individual’s ability to 
 
 82. Maxine Eichner, Marriage and the Elephant: the Liberal Democratic State’s Regulation of 
Intimate Relationships Between Adults, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 25, 26 (2007) (claiming that until 
recently, the legitimacy of the state’s involvement in and support for marriage went largely 
undisputed). 
 83. For a survey of the many tangible legal benefits of marriage, see generally David L. Chambers, 
What If? The Legal Consequences of Marriage and the Legal Needs of Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 
95 MICH. L. REV. 447 (1996) and Michael S. Wald, Same-Sex Couple Marriage: A Family Policy 
Perspective, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y  & L. 291 (2001). 
 84. See Shahar Lifshitz, Spousal Rights and Spousal Duties: The Liberal Case for Privileging 
Marriage, in THE JURISPRUDENCE OF MARRIAGE AND OTHER INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS 165, 165–
69 (Scott FitzGibbon et al. eds., 2010) (surveying the public arguments in favor of marriage). 
 85. Michal J. Trebilcock, Marriage as Signal, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 
245, 249–50 (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999); Russell D. Murphy, Jr., A Good Man Is Hard To Find: Marriage 
as an Institution, 47 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG., 27, 27–28 (2002). 
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function as a good citizen.86 Marriage constitutes a classic example of a social 
institution embodying a profound and long-term intimate commitment.87 
Accordingly, there exists a public interest in supporting the social institution of 
marriage.88 
Another type of argument focuses on the well-being of children. Extensive 
research demonstrates the importance of a stable relationship for the physical 
and mental well-being of children. This research has exposed the difficult reality 
encountered by children and mothers who live in unconventional family 
patterns—particularly in single-parent families89 but even in cohabiting 
families90—and the long-term ramifications of these difficulties. Since the well-
being of children is an outstanding public interest, this interest also supports the 
institution of marriage. 
A third type of argument relates to the benefit to society that is inherent in 
the institution of marriage. First, the financial responsibility imposed on the 
couple within the framework of marriage frees the public from the need to 
cover the costs of caring for weaker family members. In addition, theoretical 
and empirical studies illustrate that marriage has a moderating effect on 
individuals’ behavior and promotes positive social behavior in general.91 
Taking into account the public interest in promoting long-term commitment 
between spouses, it seems reasonable that the law should distinguish between 
marriage and cohabitation in order to encourage couples who are willing to 
take on a long-term commitment to get married. Yet while the law should 
distinguish marriage from cohabitation ex ante, various considerations justify 
the award of certain marital benefits to cohabitants. The law has a role in the 
protection of weaker parties within society—the responsive aspect of the law. 
Consequently, even if it is deemed appropriate to encourage couples to marry, 
 
 86. For an overview of the psychological advantages of marriage, see Linda J. Waite & Maggie 
Gallagher, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE: WHY MARRIED PEOPLE ARE HAPPIER, HEALTHIER, AND 
BETTER OFF FINANCIALLY 65–77 (2000). For an overview of the economic advantages of marriage, see 
id. at 97–123. 
 87. See Elizabeth S. Scott, Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 VA. L. REV. 
1901, 1908–10 (2000). 
 88. For a similar argument, see Carl E. Schneider, The Channeling Function in Family Law, 20 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 495, 500–01 (1992). 
 89. See SARA MCLANAHAN & GARY SANDEFUR, GROWING UP WITH A SINGLE PARENT 19–63 
(1994). 
 90. See Wendy D. Manning & Daniel T. Lichter, Parental Cohabitation and Children’s Economic 
Well-Being, 58 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 998, 1009 (1996) (finding that children in cohabitating households 
have an economic advantage over children in single-parent households but are at an economic 
disadvantage compared to children in married households). 
 91. For an economic analysis of the moderating aspects of marriage and the social benefit thereof, 
see William Bishop, Is He Married? Marriage as Information, 34 U. TORONTO L.J. 245, 259 (1984) 
(noting that marriage is a signal of desirable qualities, such as stability); David D. Haddock & Daniel 
D. Polsby, Family as a Rational Classification, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 15, 33, 42–43 (1996) (noting that 
members of traditional families generally regulate their behavior to uphold the household’s reputation; 
noting that domestic partnership can be feigned for temporary social benefits and does not implicate 
the same level of mutual responsibility). 
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it may not be appropriate to leave unmarried couples or their children to their 
own fate. Accordingly, this approach responds to the existing reality by 
establishing legal principles that recognize the institution of cohabitation and 
confer rights upon couples who have chosen that lifestyle. 
Different legal systems have sought the proper balance between the 
directive aspect of the law, which leads to distinguishing marriage and 
cohabitation, and the responsive aspect, which supports granting marital rights 
to cohabitants. The “veil of uncertainty” should have a positive role in this 
context. Regarding marriage, the channeling–directive function of the law 
should have a prominent role. The law should be clear and certain both in terms 
of who is married and of which rights apply to marriage, in order to provide an 
incentive for couples to get married. In the context of cohabitation, the directive 
and responsive aspects of law must be balanced to provide a guiding principle 
regarding which components of marital law should apply to cohabiting 
couples.92 
The components of marital law in which the principal function is to 
encourage participation in long-term relationships should not generally be 
applied to cohabiting couples. In contrast, in the case of “responsive” 
provisions, which focus on the protection of weaker family members93 (such as 
various forms of bereavement pensions) and corrective justice (such as the 
provision in torts law granting the partner of a person killed in an accident the 
right to sue the tortfeasor), our argument for distinguishing marriage and 
cohabitation is diminished. In such scenarios, the protective and responsive 
functions of the law should receive greater weight. Yet, as we have already 
explained, the responsive aspect of the law might harm its guiding aspect, as 
wide imposition of marital laws on cohabitants may blur the distinction between 
the institutions and decrease the incentive to get married. Here, legal 
uncertainty and ambiguity may serve a positive role. 
In contrast to the certainty that should characterize laws regarding marriage, 
laws relevant to cohabitants should include broad legal standards that provide 
courts with discretion to determine who should be considered a cohabitant 
under the law and which marital rights should apply. In such a legal structure, 
the ex post relief to cohabitants will not undermine the ex ante incentive for 
couples to get married. In contrast to the conventional criticism on the current 
ambiguity of laws for cohabitants, this ambiguity may actually benefit society. 
Before concluding our discussion on the marriage–cohabitation distinction, 
we would like to add three caveats. First, our analysis regarding the promotion 
of long-term commitments is implicitly premised on couples that could choose 
between marriage and cohabitation. In many Western countries, same-sex 
couples are excluded from marriage. From a liberal perspective, it is implausible 
 
 92. See Lifshitz, supra note 10. 
 93. See Braschi v. Stahl Assoc. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 53–54 (N.Y. 1989) (protecting housing rights of 
cohabitants). 
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to prevent them from getting married and to deny them marital rights. 
Accordingly, we believe that the privileges derived from marriage as a tool to 
encourage long-term commitment should also support the ability of same-sex 
couples to undertake these same commitments, either by marriage or, 
alternatively, by civil union that entails all the legal benefits of marriage. 
Regarding families with children, the responsive aspect of the law, 
particularly its protective function, should outweigh the directive aspect. 
Accordingly, those components of family law in which the overt or covert intent 
is to support children should be applied to all family models. 
Finally, this part focuses on the external rights of cohabitants, as opposed to 
their mutual duties (or internal rights). As we explain in the “limitation section” 
of this article,94 in the context of the mutual relationship between couples, 
absolute uncertainties regarding legal rights may intensify the power gap 
between parties during the course of their relationship. In this context, we 
believe that the law should provide a minimum level of certainty in order to put 
the weaker party on notice that he or she will be entitled to legal remedies 
should the couple separate.95 
2.  Bankruptcy Law 
In the context of bankruptcy law, the effect of uncertainty on the behavior 
of legal actors has been recognized and criticized.96 Much of the discussion of 
uncertainty has been with regard to the prioritization of different debts and 
debtors. Uncertainty is seen as a factor which should be reduced, rather than as 
a factor that may reduce the likelihood of an individual behaving strategically 
ex ante when considering whether to take a loan. Indeed, moral hazard is a 
major theme in a long list of laws where helping people deal with consequences 
of certain behaviors may lead to situations where those behaviors could be the 
product of manipulative intentions.97 
Legal ambiguity may curb the problem of moral hazard in bankruptcy law98 
by downplaying, ex ante, the exact reliefs defaulting debtors can receive. An 
additional illustration of the potential role of uncertainty is related to the 
increasing number of alternatives to the classic bankruptcy process. Much of the 
 
 94. See supra Part IV. 
 95. See Lifshitz, supra note 10, at 1601–02 (suggesting pluralistic regulation of spousal relationships 
which objects to full equality of marriage and cohabitation but at the same time suggests imposing 
selective components of marital law on cohabitants). 
 96. Baird and Bernstein have argued that uncertainty in the evaluation of the reorganized 
corporation is part of the reason for the lack of coherency in absolute-priority criteria. See Douglas G. 
Baird & Donald S. Bernstein, Absolute Priority, Valuation Uncertainty, and the Reorganization Bargain, 
115 YALE L.J. 1930, 1935 (2006). 
 97. For a critical review and analytical discussion, see generally Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of 
Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237 (1996). 
 98. The relationship between bankruptcy laws and morally hazardous behavior is relatively 
straightforward and has been widely recognized in the literature. See, e.g., Joseph E. Stigliz, Bankruptcy 
Laws: Basic Economic Principles, in RESOLUTION OF FINANCIAL DISTRESS (Stijn Claessens, Simeon 
Djankov & Ashoka Mody eds., 2001) (discussing lending behaviors without due diligence). 
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concern of academics who work within this literature is centered on the 
strategic behavior by the various actors involved in creditor agreements. 
Furthermore, the recent economic crisis has created many situations where 
government bailout is an additional option for companies in dire 
circumstances.99 When examining the pros and cons of who should be allowed to 
take advantage of this option and under what circumstances, the problem of 
moral hazard is mentioned as one of the main policy concerns, as executives 
may evaluate their decisions based on the likelihood of getting legal relief 
rather than on fixing the company. Keeping executives in the dark with regard 
to types of legal relief available, as well as which parts of their debts could be 
excused, could limit their focus on a law aimed at helping a company when no 
other option is available.100 
C.  Ensuring Genuine Choices 
1.  Employment Law 
The area of employment relations is one of the typical legal contexts where 
we see the dilemmas from the second type. As explained in part II, this type of 
legal ambiguity focuses on ensuring that the law does not dominate one’s 
decisions, even when the choice to do so is legitimate. Employers should not 
engage in a behavior in which the main purpose is to pay employees less than 
what the law requires, either by conferring a contractor title rather than that of 
a full-fledged employee or by arguing that the individual in question should not 
be seen as the company’s own employee. In various contexts, courts have been 
very clear in their holdings against organizations structured purely to evade the 
law. 
We demonstrate the potential effect of ambiguity in this context with regard 
to the core definition of the status of employees and employers as well as 
intellectual property created in the workplace. In the context of employment 
relations, the discussion can be divided into two basic questions: Who is an 
employee, and who is an employer? The first question discusses the same 
dilemma that we explored in our experimental sample—the distinction between 
an employee and a contractor. In many cases, both employers and employees 
prefer a situation where their relationship is flexible. The law permits service 
providers to be defined as contractors or freelancers when this is an accurate 
representation of their status. Judges and the legislature fear a situation in 
which the main or only purpose is to create a fictitious representation of the 
 
 99. Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 16, at 469–70. 
 100. We are aware of the cost of legal ambiguity in this context. For example, ambiguity may cause 
debtors to wait too long before asking for legal relief. The challenge of bankruptcy lawmakers, 
therefore, is to find the equilibrium between morally hazardous risks and over-deterrence. A possible 
option is to continue with the general broad standards ex ante but to add to the existing ambiguous 
system a semi-individualized pre-ruling mechanism ex post that provides executives who run into 
financial distress the ability to estimate the legal result of bankruptcy versus alternative debt 
arrangements. 
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employee as a contractor in order to evade the legal responsibilities employers 
have toward their employees. In such a situation, due to the asymmetry 
between employers and employees, such employees will not enjoy the benefits 
contractors enjoy (for example, higher salary, flexibility, intellectual-property 
rights) nor will contractors enjoy the benefits of employees (for example, 
greater job security and equal protection rights).101 In this context, a common 
criticism is related to the complex definition of the word “employee.” 
In many legal systems, the definition of “employee” may change from one 
statute to the next. In addition, courts have employed various tests to define 
“employee” that take into account various factors that can sometimes be 
determined only ex post (for example, the “true nature” of the relationship and 
how parties perceive themselves).102 The complexity of those tests and factors 
are often criticized. 
Despite the problems associated with ambiguity in this context, there is at 
least some value in the fact that employers facing ambiguity may be less 
motivated by legal concerns in forming the relationships they maintain in the 
workplace. Our simple experimental manipulation has shown this exact 
phenomenon: Preference for employing an individual as a contractor was 
reduced when legal status was ambiguous. The other primary way that 
employers evade responsibility is with regard to their status as employers, 
something which is especially problematic in “triangular” relationships, where 
the user enterprise tries to escape its responsibilities as an employer.103 
In the context of who is an employee, one may point to the relatively 
dominant involvement of courts in determining how the tests should be applied. 
We see the reverse trend when the legislature has attempted to suggest clear ex 
ante rules to determine when the user enterprise should be seen as the 
employer.104 
In a recent example from Israeli law, there has been an attempt to replace 
with legislation the discretion traditionally given to the courts regarding 
employment status. Under the legislation, the user enterprise would act as the 
employer after nine to fifteen months of tenure. Under this approach, 
employers know in advance the length of time they can safely employ people 
 
 101. For a comparative discussion of many of the tests used by the United States, Canada, and the 
United Kingdom, see generally Guy Davidov, Who Is a Worker?, 34 INDUS. L.J. 57 (2005). 
 102. Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical Review and 
Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. REV 351, 417–20 (2002). 
 103. See Stephen F. Befort, Revisiting the Black Hole of Workplace Regulation: A Historical and 
Comparative Perspective of Contingent Work, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 153, 162–63 (2003). 
 104. For a discussion of this issue in Germany, see Anke Freckmann, Temporary Employment 
Business in Germany, 15 INT’L CO. & COM. L. REV. 7, 8 (2004). Similar laws can be seen in France and 
Belgium that have strict ex ante limitations both on the length of time and on the reasons that justify 
using contractors. Furthermore, in these countries, there is an equal-pay requirement for contractors. 
See generally Sabine Smith-Vidal, France, in TEMPORARY AGENCY WORK AND THE INFORMATION 
SOCIETY 115 (Roger Blanpain & Ronnie Graham eds., 2004); Othmar Vanachter, Labour Law and the 
Division of Power Between the Federal Level, the Communities and the Regions in Belgium, in 
FEDERALISM AND LABOUR LAW 21 (Othmar Vanachter & Martin Vranken eds., 2004). 
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without any fear of legal intervention.105 In the context of contingent 
employees—employees who are formally employed through one entity but 
provide their services to a second entity—defining who is the employer is 
especially important. This is primarily because many of the “formal employers” 
are unable to take care of their employees’ basic needs. Legal ambiguity 
regarding the permissible length of time of contingent work may make user 
enterprises less likely to consider hiring people for fourteen months as a way to 
evade the law. 
We understand the limitations of our approach, especially when it comes to 
relatively weak employees who lack ex ante knowledge. Without ex ante 
knowledge of the law, for example, employees may wait too long before 
claiming that an employer has engaged in fictitious transactions in defining 
them as temporary employees. Therefore, the argument for the advantages of 
ex ante legal ambiguity is stronger in situations where the decision to clarify 
one’s legal status is not based solely on risk perception of weaker parties. In 
situations where the weaker party is expected to act first, the cost of legal 
ambiguity may exceed the benefit. 
The second context we would like to discuss is the area of intellectual 
property in the workplace. In this context, the role of ambiguity in preventing 
strategic behavior by both employees and employers is complicated. Employees 
are obligated not to divulge trade secrets and proprietary knowledge to entities 
outside the corporation, and employers are obligated to respect the intellectual 
property in employees’ inventions. 
When deciding to what types of information the employee will be exposed, 
there is an inherent conflict of interest between the employee and the employer. 
With regard to the protection of confidential information, it is obvious that 
employees want to learn information that could also be used when they leave 
the company. In contrast, the employer’s main interest is that its employees 
learn skills that will improve their productivity while they are working for the 
company. The employer has no interest (and perhaps has a negative incentive) 
in having employees learn information that could be used when they leave the 
company. Given the increasing rate at which employees move between 
companies in recent years, the effect of this conflict is substantial with regard to 
the types of information to which employees will be exposed.106 A situation 
where both employers and employees will not have a clear ex ante view of what 
information is proprietary may ensure that employees have greater motivation 
to learn as well as more opportunities to do so. 
 
 105. Indeed, very recently, the National Labor Court in Israel allowed a company to fire a 
temporary worker after nine months even though there was no other reason behind the layoff. See File 
No. 759-39-10 National Labor Court, Zohar Golan v. O.R.S (Dec. 9, 2010), Padaor (by subscription) 
(Isr.). 
 106. See Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the Changing 
Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519, 594 (2001). 
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This argument needs a few adjustments and adaptations to stand up to 
several possible criticisms. First, ex post when employees leave the company, 
some clarification will be needed to avoid over-deterrence situations. Second, 
even ex ante employees need clear rules as to which types of information may 
be disclosed while they are working for the company. For example, employees 
should be able to distinguish between topics they are free to discuss and those 
that are off limits. 
The argument regarding the distributive effects of ambiguity is 
demonstrated nicely in the context of employment relations. The greater risk 
aversion of employees, as well as their greater fear of ambiguity, may suggest 
that without ex ante clarity, they may work in the company for more time than 
is efficient for them simply because they are not certain of their ex post status. 
Similarly, employers may have better tools for dealing with such ex ante 
uncertainty, such as organizational measures that would replace the incentives 
offered by the state. Employees would have limited ability to employ 
countermeasures. Distributive concerns may arise when employees who are 
unclear about the law refrain from discussing their rights when leaving the 
company or looking for another job. 
Yet these concerns are only partly valid. Our analysis distinguishes between 
ex ante and ex post situations. The ex post status deals with a situation where an 
employee (especially when it comes to sophisticated high-tech employees) is 
planning to leave a company and seeks legal advice to sufficiently understand 
the relevant law. In the ex ante status, the disjunction-effect prediction and our 
own empirical demonstration suggest that both employers and employees are 
less likely to focus on the legal status of the information employees are exposed 
to during their tenure in the workplace. While recognizing the costs associated 
with such ambiguity, we argue that the effort to draw a clear distinction 
between proprietary and non-proprietary knowledge comes with a cost that also 
needs to be recognized. 
2.  Tax Law and Tax Shelters 
As already mentioned, tax law provides an additional illustration of the 
potential role of uncertainty in law, under the second type.107 A prominent 
example of this distorting effect is the tax shelter. Indeed, the term “tax shelter” 
refers to transactions “carefully designed to fit within the letter” of various 
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code and Regulations to derive benefits 
unintended by those sections.108 
Legal systems have fought against tax shelters through a combination of 
dynamic legislation and ex post judicial intervention. Legislators attempt to stop 
transactions that involve tax shelters by denying taxpayers the benefits that 
made the transactions worthwhile in the first place. Yet, due to the complexity 
 
 107. See Weisbach, supra note 19. 
 108. Shannon Weeks McCormack, Tax Shelters and Statutory Interpretation: A Much Needed 
Purposive Approach, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 697, 699 (2009). 
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of tax systems, taxpayers enlist the services of the best consultants, and, 
therefore, even the best legislators fail to block all such possible shelters. In 
addition, statutory and regulatory amendments rarely operate retroactively in 
the tax arena, with few, if any, exceptions. Thus, the benefits of successful tax 
planning survive, even if the law is changed when the shelter is exposed.109 
Courts often use the “economic substance doctrine” as a tool to limit tax 
shelters.110 The economic-substance doctrine usually contains a combination of 
two inquiries. First, courts inquire objectively whether the transaction has a 
reasonable prospect of a pretax profit—that is, whether the taxpayer could have 
profited in the absence of the tax benefits gained—after taking into account 
transaction costs.111 An additional test112 focuses on the taxpayer’s subjective 
intention, namely, whether in entering the transaction the taxpayer was 
motivated by a business purpose other than obtaining a tax benefit.113 
While legislation that covers undesirable tax shelters and the economic-
substance doctrine are important in the struggle against tax shelters, the veil of 
uncertainty may serve as a complementary tool in this struggle. 
As we have seen, the goal of the struggle against tax shelters is to prevent 
taxpayers from engaging in legal actions with the sole purpose of avoiding taxes. 
Therefore, concealing the tax consequences of a certain action may result in the 
action being taken in accordance with pertinent economic considerations and 
not out of a desire to fit any specific mold.114 The total concealment of tax 
consequences is not feasible. However, as the behavioral part of this article has 
shown, vague legal principles trigger the psychological process of disjunction, 
leading people to base behavior on considerations other than vague legal 
results. Accordingly, vague tax principles weaken the incentive to engage in tax 
planning, and, instead, encourage a focus on the substantive planning of a 
transaction. Furthermore, most tax planners and users of tax shelters are 
affluent, and the struggle against tax shelters may also have a positive 
distributive effect.115 
 At this juncture, we should add a significant caveat to the argument in favor 
of vague rules in tax law. In the introduction, we suggested that laying a 
smokescreen over the tax consequences of a certain action is worthwhile only to 
 
 109. Id. at 704–05. 
 110. See Davis P. Hariton, Sorting Out the Tangle of Economic Substance, 52 TAX LAW. 235, 237–40 
(1999) (describing the types of challenges Commissioners may bring under the economic-substance 
doctrine). 
 111. ACM P’ship v. Comm’r, 157 F.3d 231, 248 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 112. For the purpose of this article, it is unnecessary to figure out the exact relationships between 
these two inquiries. 
 113. See, e.g., Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, 436 F.3d 431, 441 (2006); Coltec Indus., Inc. v. 
United States, 454 F.3d 1340, 1355 (2006). 
 114. See, e.g., Jacob Nussim, Taxes, Prices, and Consumer Protection 3 (Bar Ilan Univ. Pub. Law, 
Working Paper, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1397643 (justifying the common practice in 
the United States of listing prices excluding sales tax rather than listing prices with sales tax included, as 
such a practice prevents the distorting effect of tax on behavior). 
 115. Weisbach, supra note 19, at 223. 
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prevent a person from performing the action for tax purposes. In many 
instances, however, tax laws are meant to encourage people to diverge from 
their regular way of behaving, and to act in a certain manner encouraged by tax 
legislators.116 In such cases, the concealment of the legal results of an action, or 
even the creation of uncertainty regarding its results, undermines the goals of 
tax legislators. 
In the literature concerning the doctrine of artificiality, there was a recent 
call to distinguish between situations in which the artificial transaction 
undermines the legislator’s goal and instances in which the goal is realized. In 
the former, the artificial nature of the transaction should be exposed. The latter, 
in contrast, deals with cases where the legislator gives a tax benefit to investors 
in certain locations who engage in certain activities or to taxpayers who employ 
a certain type of person—both of which should not be invalidated solely 
because they are intended to derive tax savings.117 In such cases, where tax law 
aims to direct behavior, ambiguity is undesirable, as the rule is intended to be 
formulated in a clear and concise manner. In instances where it is important to 
encourage activity lacking a legal motivation, however, the veil of uncertainty is 
beneficial. 
D.  Shielding Altruistic Motivation 
The last type of analysis is pro-social motivation, where the use of 
uncertainty is also desirable. We begin with a unique example from an Israeli 
context and continue on to a discussion of surrogacy laws. 
1.  Incentivizing Reserve Duty 
A classic policy debate in Israeli society is related to incentives for those 
serving on reserve duty in the military. Although military service in Israel is 
mandatory, many Israelis use various medical and personal excuses to evade 
serving their reserve duty. In an attempt to provide incentives to more Israelis 
to serve reserve duty, there have been various legislative changes to increase 
the economic attractiveness of this service. In this context, the government faces 
a tricky dilemma. On the one hand, given the need to increase the value of 
incentives, there is a need to overplay their value. On the other hand, making 
money too much of a factor may crowd out patriotism as an intrinsic 
motivation, despite the risks faced by people who serve. 
Here, we might have a different distributive effect than that described in 
other types discussed previously. For lower-income people, monetary benefits 
will be more valuable than to people from middle- and high-income families. 
Therefore, informing people about the monetary incentives associated with 
 
 116. See Edward A. Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes: The Rehabilitation of Tax Incentives, 64 
TEX. L. REV. 973, 975–76 (1986) (arguing that some tax incentives may be more efficient policy tools 
than direct-expenditure programs). 
 117. See McCormack, supra note 108, at 722 (arguing that courts should examine the purposes of a 
given law and “strip taxpayers of benefits that are discordant with those purposes”). 
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reserve duty, may not only crowd out intrinsic motivation, but may also send 
different signals to different segments of society. Thus, the use of uncertainty in 
the type of rewards offered to soldiers may curb the negative effects of using 
incentives ex ante while still making sure that a reimbursement ex post will 
prevent people from feeling taken advantage of. 
2.  Surrogacy Contracts 
An idiosyncratic use of vague principles is exemplified in the area of 
surrogate-motherhood contracts. Such an arrangement is one in which a woman 
agrees to bear a child for a commissioning couple. Surrogate-mother 
arrangements, like the baby-making market in general, were supported at first 
mainly by the outstanding proponents of the imposition of “commercial 
market” norms on numerous realms of behavior.  118 With time, however, 
surrogate-motherhood agreements119 raised fears regarding the exploitation of 
economically disadvantaged women and opposition to the commodification of 
personal services.  120 These objections were raised in the famous Baby M 
decision, which expressed a position hostile to surrogacy contracts.  121 The Baby 
M decision was followed by several legislative acts that prohibited or greatly 
restricted surrogate-motherhood contracts.  122 Baby-making markets and 
surrogate-motherhood contracts have been widely discussed in scholarly 
literature as well. Scholars have made general commodification arguments 
about the damage caused to the concept of paternity by the trading of fertility 
and birthing services.  123  
Despite the fears of exploitation and commodification, there are distinct 
advantages to surrogate-motherhood contracts that should not be ignored. First, 
surrogate motherhood, like other modern procreation techniques conducted 
within a contractual relationship (for example, egg donations), constitutes a 
 
 118. See Richard A. Epstein, Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual Enforcement, 81 VA. L. REV. 
2305, 2330–34 (1995) (concluding that the analogy of surrogacy to baby-selling “only strengthens the 
conclusion that surrogacy transactions should be legal”); Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, 
The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323, 324 (1978) (advocating a market in 
babies). 
 119. See, e.g., Carol Sanger, Developing Markets in Baby-Making: In the Matter of Baby M, 30 
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 67 (2007). 
 120. Radin, supra note 12, at 1930–33. 
 121. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1234 (N.J. 1988) (holding that a full surrogacy agreement is 
unenforceable). 
 122. Elizabeth S. Scott, Surrogacy and the Politics of Commodification, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 109, 117–20 (Summer 2009). See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218 (1989) (prohibiting 
surrogacy contracts), invalidated by Soos v. Superior Court, 897 P.2d 1356 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994); IND. 
CODE ANN. § 31-20-1-1 (West 2010) (prohibiting enforcement of most surrogacy agreements); LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713 (2010) (declaring surrogacy contracts void); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 
722.855–59 (West 2010) (declaring surrogacy contracts void and imposing criminal penalties on parties 
to such contracts); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,200 (2010) (declaring surrogacy contracts void). 
 123. See Radin, supra note 12, at 1931–32 (suggesting that surrogacy furthers the misconception that 
a genetic connection between fathers and children is necessary to facilitate bonding); see also 
Anderson, supra note 12 (discussing commodification in surrogacy arrangements generally). 
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valuable contribution for childless women. As surrogacy is not a simple process 
for the surrogate mother, few women would consent to volunteer to become a 
surrogate without financial compensation. Instead of presenting the surrogate 
mother as either one who has been exploited, or as a shrewd businesswoman, a 
completely different narrative has developed, one that presents the surrogate 
mother as an autonomous woman in control of her body who chooses to use it 
to aid another woman. Consequently, a considerable number of contemporary 
feminist writers emphasize the altruistic aspect of surrogacy, which also reflects 
the solidarity between women.  124 Beyond the theoretical discussions, an 
approach sympathetic to surrogacy has also developed in court decisions in 
recent years.125 
In general, we share this sympathetic attitude toward surrogate-motherhood 
contracts. Yet we maintain that a proper legal arrangement should also attempt 
to take into account the traditional approach’s apprehensions regarding the 
commodification of bearing children and the application of commercial contract 
norms to surrogate-motherhood contracts.  126  
The example of surrogate-motherhood contracts illustrates the third type 
discussed in this article—the “shielding of altruistic motivation.” This type 
relates to instances where the law should encourage a certain type of altruistic 
activity ex ante. Additionally, the law should recognize the ex post entitlement 
of monetary compensation for the efforts and the risk that people have 
undertaken. Yet legislatures may fear that the excessive prominence of 
compensation may cast the action in an excessively commercial light in a way 
that could harm the psychological and social quality of the action. 
In the background of these competing interests, we propose a procedure for 
surrogate-motherhood contracts that will, on one hand, encourage such 
agreements and, on the other hand, contend with the issue of commodification 
and the crowding-out effect. The law should allow surrogacy contracts and 
clarify that such contracts are to be honored. Instead of setting forth an explicit 
price tag in the contract itself in a manner that focuses on the commercial 
 
 124. See, e.g., Sanger, supra note 119, at 75–78 (describing the motivation of surrogate mothers as “a 
complex blend of altruism and gain”); Scott, supra note 122 (analyzing the first wave of feminist 
objection to surrogacy agreements). 
 125. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 784 (Cal. 1993) (en banc) (enforcing a gestational-
surrogacy agreement against the gestational-surrogate mother). Yet it is important to note that, unlike 
the Baby M case that addresses full surrogacy, most of the modern cases have addressed gestational 
surrogacy. For criticism on the distinction between gestational- and traditional-surrogacy contracts in 
the existing law, see generally Noa Ben-Asher, The Curing Law: On the Evolution of Baby-Making 
Markets, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1885 (2009). For a survey on the existing laws in various countries, see 
Hugh V. McLachlan & J. Kim Swales, Commercial Surrogate Motherhood and the Alleged 
Commodification of Children: A Defense of Legally Enforceable Contracts, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 91, 92–96 (Summer 2009). 
 126. Cf. Martha M. Ertman, What’s Wrong with a Parenthood Market? A New and Improved Theory 
of Commodification, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1, 58–59 (2003) (proposing an “antiessentialist” theory of 
commodification of parental roles that accounts for “multiple meanings”). 
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aspect, administrative bodies127 should, ex post, determine the proper payment 
for surrogate motherhood, in accordance with the criteria set forth under the 
law. 
In this manner, legal support for surrogate-motherhood contracts will be 
attained, while a veil of uncertainty will be drawn over their commercial–
economic aspects. In the spirit of the crowding-out literature and according to 
our approach, someone interested in surrogacy solely due to the monetary 
aspect will refrain from entering into such a contract because of the uncertainty 
regarding the amount of the payment. In contrast, someone who is interested in 
surrogacy because of the altruistic nature of the act, but who also has a desire 
for monetary compensation, will not be deterred from participating in such an 
act for lack of precise knowledge of the sum of the compensation. 
Furthermore, the prohibition of surrogate-motherhood contracts containing 
a price tag and the establishment of external agencies would limit the fears of 
the exploitation of weak parties. In this sense, the establishment of a veil of 
uncertainty in the realm of surrogate-motherhood contracts may have a 
distributive effect supportive of economically weak parties. 
As an aside, the arena of organ donations is also marked by the tension 
between the fear of exploitation, commodification, and crowding-out effects 
and the desire to encourage donations, acknowledging that some compensation 
to the donor is fair and just. In most countries, these fears have led to a 
prohibition of trading in organs. We believe that, in this context as well, it is 
possible for administrative agencies to place a veil of uncertainty that would 
determine ex post the compensation due to donors, while diminishing the fears 
of exploitation, commodification, and crowding-out. 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
For the most part, uncertainty and ambiguity have a bad reputation in legal 
scholarship. This paper did not challenge that assertion, but rather 
demonstrated the positive role that ambiguity may play in various legal 
contexts. Our argument had two prongs: jurisprudential and behavioral. 
The jurisprudential argument identified a typology of three contexts and 
circumstances where creating a “veil of ignorance,” which masks people’s 
awareness and knowledge of the ex post legal consequences of their acts, may 
be desirable. 
The behavioral argument suggested that a “veil of ignorance” in those three 
types may be achieved through the use of ambiguity within the law. Our 
behavioral and empirical analysis addressed the way people react to ambiguous 
benefits. We argued that legal ambiguity may cause people to undermine their 
 
 127. Apparently, the function of completing the accurate reimbursement fees could have been 
fulfilled by the courts. Nonetheless, we believe that administrative agencies have greater expertise and 
are less likely than courts to antagonize the parties by creating unnecessary rivalry between them. 
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consideration for the law altogether and refer to alternative motivational goals. 
Therefore, our focus was not on how people make decisions under conditions of 
uncertainty, but rather on how people may avoid taking legality into account 
and choose alternative paths of behavior when the law cannot give them 
certainty. 
Following this theoretical discussion, we used an experimental survey 
approach to measure one’s response to uncertainty within the law. This 
hypothetical context explored the decision-making process of an employer who 
had to decide whether to employ an individual as an employee or as a 
contractor. Our findings suggested that under conditions of both uncertainty 
and ambiguity, participants were less affected by benefits granted under the 
law. In contrast, when participants were asked to evaluate the behavior of 
others, uncertain benefits did have an effect on their evaluations. Furthermore, 
we identified the existence of an interaction between the effect of uncertainty 
and the strength of an individual’s preferences. Uncertainty was especially 
relevant for individuals with low and intermediate levels of preference for 
employees’ rights but not for those with strong preferences. Based on the 
behavioral demonstration, we explored the distorting effect of the law and 
suggested using a “veil of uncertainty” as a means to curb this distorting effect. 
At the same time, we recognized that such a “veil of uncertainty” may 
certainly undermine important functions of the law such as guiding one’s 
behavior through the use of deterrence and incentives, expressing social values, 
and influence on social institutions. 
This article recognized some of the drawbacks may arise due to uncertainty 
and hence illustrated several refinements and limitations regarding the use of a 
“veil of uncertainty” mechanism in order to improve its potential benefits for 
lawmakers. In the last part of the article, we demonstrated the potential rule of 
the “veil of uncertainty” as well as its application to various areas of law (for 
example, marriage law, bankruptcy law, employment law, tax law, and 
surrogacy contracts). This last part demonstrated that, properly used, 
uncertainty can dramatically enhance efficiency and fairness and prevent the 
undesirable phenomena of excessive commodification of certain relationships, 
as well as crowding-out. 
 
